Articles
“Bringing The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven to Unreached People.” Journal of the Evangelical Missiological Society, Spring 2024.
Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) was an Italian Jesuit and one of the first Christian missionaries to China in the modern era. He was a genuine polymath—a translator, cartographer, mathematician, astronomer, and musician. Above all, Ricci was a missionary for the gospel. As we briefly examine his 1603 seminal work, The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, our hope is that we, as evangelical educators, will perceive some of the deeper principles necessary for our own missionary work among unreached people.
“Free Will vs. Free Choice in Aquinas’ De Malo.” Theophron, Spring 2023.
The goal of this paper is to show that Thomas Aquinas, in his Disputed Questions on Evil, presents a theory of free will that is compatibilist but still involves a version of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and even requires alternative possibilities for a certain kind of responsibility. In Aquinas’ view, choosing between possibilities is not the primary power of the will. Rather, choice arises through the complex interaction of various parts of human psychology, in particular through the indeterminacy of the intellect and through the interaction between reason and passion. Both of these ways provide cases where Aquinas not only allows for alternative possibilities but thinks that they are necessary for moral responsibility, all the while remaining, strictly speaking, a compatibilist.
“Conformed by Praise: Xunzi and William of Auxerre on the Ethics of Liturgy.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Winter 2022.
The classical Confucian philosopher Xunzi proposed a virtue ethics account of ritual: rituals are not supernatural or magical actions, but rather are practices that serve to channel human emotion in a way that leads to flourishing. Ritual is not natural, but was constructed by the ancient sage-kings in conformity with nature, and thus is necessary for the development of virtue.
In this paper I put Xunzi’s account of ritual to the test by using it to read the Summa de Officiis Ecclesiasticis, a commentary on the Catholic liturgy by the early 13th century theologian William of Auxerre. In particular, I focus on William’s use of purpose clauses (ut + subjunctive and ad + gerund) to explain the meaning of different liturgical actions. William attributes causal power to liturgy, but this power is not magical, but rhetorical. He places great emphasis on the ethical, emotional, and mental effects of the liturgy, all with the goal of making the participants like the blessed in heaven through the development of the virtues. In addition, William’s discussion of the origin of various liturgical practices is reminscent of Xunzi’s account of the sage-kings. Xunzi’s writings on ritual illuminate and enrich one’s reading of the Summa de Officiis, lending plausibility to the Xunzian account.
Finally, I consider where William and Xunzi disagree. Xunzi discounts the possibility of direct supernatural intervention in both the origin and effects of ritual. William disagrees on both counts. With regard to ritual’s origin, at least some of the liturgy is divinely inspired (the text of Scripture), and all of it is a response to supernatural events (the life of Jesus and the worship of God in heaven). With regard to ritual’s effects, although most of William’s causal language can be explained in Xunzian terms, the efficacy of the sacraments and the role of the Holy Spirit in the development of the virtues cannot. Xunzi’s virtue ethics enriches our understanding of the role of ritual in ethical development, and protects against a crude, magical understanding of religious ritual; but a sophisticated, philosophical understanding of sacramental grace is a necessary complement to a Xunzian account of Christian liturgical practice.
Theses
William of Auxerre and Thomas Aquinas on Simultaneous Faith and Knowledge (PhD Dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, May 2021)
In this dissertation I will consider how two 13th century theologians, William of Auxerre (1156-1231) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), explored the question, “Whether the same thing can be known (demonstratively) and (believed by faith)” (utrum idem sit scitum et creditum). Both denied that this was possible, but they differed in the relative epistemic priority of faith and
knowledge. Aquinas thought that demonstrative knowledge has epistemic priority over faith: for example, if someone knows a proof for God’s existence, then they know that God exists, and it is impossible for them to have faith that God exists. Aquinas is a knowledge-prioritarian. William, on the other hand, thought that faith has epistemic priority over knowledge: if someone has faith that God exists, then even if they know a proof for God’s existence, they have faith, and not knowledge, that God exists. William is a faith-prioritarian. William holds to this view because he thinks that the virtue of faith does not involve trusting authority, but rather seeing God for oneself. This allows it to have epistemic priority over demonstrative knowledge.
Ex Theologicis Rationibus: Faith and Reason in William of Auxerre (MPhil Thesis, Katholieke Univesiteit Leuven, June 2015)
Although William of Auxerre occupies a key position in the history of medieval philosophy, he has been little studied, especially by philosophers. In this paper we will study William’s position on the relation between faith and reason as found in his major work, the Summa Aurea. The paper consists in an analysis of William’s explicit comments on the relevance of philosophical reasoning to faith and two case studies which show how William put his teaching into practice.
William’s explicit teaching on the relationship between faith and reason is found in the Prologue to the Summa Aurea. Here William at first presents objections against the use of reason in matters of faith, but then confidently refutes these objections. According to William, genuine Christian faith rests on God directly and does not require argument of any kind. Thus faith has a much higher epistemic priority than reason. However, by the same token, reason can do nothing to weaken faith; in fact, according to William, it can only strengthen faith. William argues surprisingly but plausibly that the presence of faith in one’s mind is in no way affected by the presence of knowledge and rational proof, and so it is possible for one to simultaneously believe in the articles of faith on the authority of God and know that they are true because of philosophical proof.
Presentations
“Nonverbal Ritual in William of Auxerre and Xunzi.” KU Leuven Colloquia in Medieval Philosophy, March 2024.
Does a Confucian rationale for nonverbal ritual apply to Christian liturgy, which is mainly verbal? How can we compare religious ideas across cultures separated by time and space?
The Confucian philosopher Xunzi argues that the function of ritual is to develop virtue by channeling emotions. The medieval Catholic theologian William of Auxerre claims that the liturgy influences participants’ feelings and imagination to make them virtuous. They appear to have the same view on the role of ritual. But are they even talking about the same thing? What Xunzi calls ritual is nonverbal: he discusses the use of actions and objects, not scripts or prayers. But William is discussing the words of Christian liturgy, the prayers spoken and Scriptures read. Can we actually bring them into conversation with each other?
I have three answers to this challenge. First, both sets of phenomena the two discuss fall under a general category of ritual as a scripted action, repeated on a schedule, performed for a reason other than its direct benefit. Both are answering the same fundamental philosophical question: Why do we do the same sorts of things over and over again even if they don’t, in themselves, benefit us or anyone else? Second, William also discusses nonverbal aspects of ritual: the allegorical meanings behind the musical modes used in Gregorian chant; the order of procession and the objects carried by various ministers; the times of day and year when liturgies are performed. His method of analysis is the same as when he discusses verbal ritual, so that he, at least, thinks verbal and nonverbal ritual fall under the same category. Third, William never says that a given liturgical prayer, song, or action “signifies” or “means” anything at all. Rather, they are done “in order to signify.” Signification is part of the liturgical act: it is what the participants in the liturgy do, not what the words do on their own. So when William is discussing the meaning of ritual words, this is subordinate to his discussion of the meaning of ritual action.
“Believing Babies, Virtuous Singing: William of Auxerre’s Social Philosophy of Religion.” New Social Perspectives in Medieval Philosophy, Paris, February 2024.
William of Auxerre’s religious epistemology appears radically individualistic. On William’s view, the faithful soul, transformed by grace, becomes a mirror of God, so that when the soul introspects, it sees God within itself, generating belief in the articles of faith. William characterizes this belief not as trust in authority, but as spiritual vision. Furthermore, on the debate over the primacy of the theological virtues, William adopts the minority position that it is faith, and not charity, that causes the other virtues to exist in the soul. This means that faith, conceived as something that happens exclusively between God and the individual believer, is the necessary and sufficient cause of salvation.
In a view like this, what room is there for a social element to religious belief and religious life? Is there any need for churches or Bibles at all? It turns out that William gives reasons why spirituality has a social element rooted in his philosophical account of the human person and powers, and so we can justly say that William gives a social philosophy of religion.
There are two key concepts to grasp: “provoking cause” and “remote habit.” A provoking cause does not cause the existence of a habit, but rather prompts an agent to put a habit into act. And while someone who has a proximate habit can bring that habit into act whenever they want, someone who has a remote habit cannot: remote habits require provoking causes in order to become actual. His clearest use of this idea is in his discussion of faith and reason. Although philosophical arguments do not strictly cause belief, they can serve as provoking causes, prompting you to assent to what you already know to be true. They can even habituate you to assent more readily and with greater confidence, keep you from falling into heresy or unbelief, and enable you to articulate beliefs that you couldn’t put into words before.
We see William using these two concepts in his discussion of the education of young Christians. William maintains that baptized infants have faith. But this causes two problems. First, how can they have faith if they do not have propositional beliefs? Second, once they do form propositional beliefs, won’t they do it on the basis of the authority of their parents or priest, contrary to William’s account of faith? William answers that baptized infants have a remote habit of faith, not a proximate one: they have the habit, but they can’t consciously affirm the articles of faith, because they haven’t been taught how to articulate them. By being catechized, the child is prompted to look within him or herself, see what God has placed in his or her soul, see that it corresponds to what the teacher is proposing, and then assent to it. Even though their beliefs are grounded in God’s revelation to their soul, the teacher acts as a provoking cause. So, even though faith is strictly speaking something that happens between God and the soul, there is a necessary social element to faith. Through these distinctions, William is able to affirm that children (as well as uneducated adults) are full members of the community of faith and also that membership in that community, including catechization, is necessary for faith.
The second place where William affirms the social element of faith is in liturgy. If faith is all you need, why bother with church ritual? William’s answer is that faith does not last long without the cultivation of moral virtue, and just as reason in tandem with faith develops intellectual virtue, performing rituals focuses emotion and imagination is so that the worshipper can develop virtue. There is an irreducible social element in this: “the Church” is the author of the rituals; actions are performed and words are said “in order to signify” hidden truths to the body of worshippers; different ritual roles symbolize characters in Biblical stories, engaging the body and emotions in worship and linking Christian to the Apostles and the Israelites. And although he does not use the same philosophical terminology in his liturgical commentary as he does in his academic theological writing, the concepts William used to explain the faith of baptized infants also show that his social vision of liturgical practice is not inconsistent with his admittedly individualistic view of faith.
“Teaching Logic as a Liberal Art: Natural Language Logic in the High School Classroom.” American Philosophical Association Central Conference Teaching Hub, Poster Session, January 2021.
Click here for poster.
“The Mysterious Order, Revisited: Aquinas on Avicenna’s Metaphysics of Possibility.” Loyola History of Philosophy Roundtable, October 2020.
In this paper I correct a misreading of Aquinas’ reception of Avicenna’s metaphysics. Beatrice Zedler (Traditio 1948) argues that Aquinas rejected Avicenna’s doctrine of metaphysical possibility because it entails that possible essences preexist God’s act of creation. This “mysterious order of possibles” acts as a restraint on God’s creative power. Olga Lizzini (American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 2014) disputes Zedler’s reading of Avicenna, but accepts that it was Aquinas’ reading. Although Lizzini is right to dispute this reading of Avicenna, she is wrong to assume that Aquinas read Avicenna in this way.
First, Avicenna’s metaphysics does not entail a preexisting order of possibles. Avicenna defines a possible being as that which can be posited as existing or as not existing. Thus all creatures are possible in themselves. The only sense in which possibles exist logically prior to creation is in God’s intellect and active potency.
Second, contra Zedler, Aquinas accepts Avicenna’s metaphysics of possibility. In the De Potentia he says that a being is possible if it has, within itself, a principle of corruption, and necessary if it does not. But he also says that there is another sense of the term “possible,” which matches Avicenna’s definition. Although he does not entirely agree with Avicenna’s metaphysics of being, his disagreements do not concern an independent order of possibles.
Third, contra Lizzini, Aquinas did not understand Avicenna to subscribe to the existence of a “mysterious order of possibles.” In the De Potentia Aquinas directly considers whether the quiddities of things are created by God. His reply is Avicennian: the pre-created quiddity exists only in the intellect of the Creator. And he explicitly cites Avicenna as an ally against those who think that anything exists independently of God. So Aquinas does not share Zedler’s incorrect reading of Avicenna.
“The Drunk Geometer: Philoponus on De Anima 3.4-8.” Aquinas and the Arabs Conference, Notre Dame, August 25, 2017.
In his commentary on the De Anima, Philoponus provides an interpretation of the agent intellect that appears quite reasonable at first, yet lacks an analogue in the tradition. His account of the potential intellect, by contrast, is extremely un-Aristotelian, at least according to standard interpretations of Aristotle. He argues that the agent intellect merely refers to a human teacher, i.e., a previously actualized intellect imparting its actuality to another human’s potential intellect, on analogy with formal impression on matter. The potential intellect, by contrast, is in second potentiality rather than first potentiality, and in fact in a special kind of second potentiality, a doctrine which he explains by claiming that Aristotle believed in Platonic reincarnation and recollection. Philoponus’ account of the potential intellect allows him to answer some important objections to his doctrine of the active intellect. On the final analysis, while Philoponus’ account ultimately fails as an interpretation of Aristotle, his arguments are surprisingly cogent and his unusual position quite coherent. Moreover, his objections to some standard readings of Aristotle appear to be valid. Whatever the final verdict on Philoponus’ commentary, I hope to vindicate him as a skillful, if inaccurate, interpreter of Aristotle.
“Anselm on Faith Seeking Understanding: Is Something Missing?” Loyola History of Philosophy Roundtable, February 16, 2018.
In the 11th century, Anselm initiated the scholastic project of “faith seeking understanding” (fides quaerens intellectum; FQI) by arguing that it’s both permissible and spiritually beneficial for faithful Christians to use reason to understand what they already believe. But because Anselm does not give a precise definition or description of faith, he does not successfully show how faith and reason can coexist. And there are good reasons, even Anselmian reasons, to think that they cannot. This is not a fatal flaw in Anselm’s philosophy, but an indication that something is missing. In this paper my goal is to show that without an account of faith that explains how it can coexist with rational argument, Anselm’s FQI is incomplete and vulnerable to major objections, but armed with such an account, it can escape them. First, I will give a brief account of FQI as Anselm sees it. Then I will give a powerful objection to FQI (the “Damning Objection,” DO), based on an intuitive definition of faith. Then we will look at Anselm’s defense of FQI, and conclude that it is insufficient to defend him from DO, since he cannot refute its definition of faith. Finally, we will change our strategy and consider what kind of redefinition of faith would allow Anselm to escape DO. We conclude that the account of faith given by William of Auxerre (d. 1231) solves Anselm’s problem.
“Faith and Reason in William of Auxerre.” Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ satellite session, American Catholic Philosophical Association Meeting, November 4, 2016.
William of Auxerre accommodates philosophy within traditional theology by developing a unique, Aristotelian psychology of faith. Faith is a supernatural perfection of the intellect that causes the mind to directly perceive the truth of the articles of Christian religion, in an analogous way to the mind’s perception of natural first principles. As such, faith is not inferior to knowledge, but is one of the most certain forms of knowledge. Theology, therefore, is a deductive, Aristotelian science, with the articles of faith as its first principles. These first principles, however, are also conclusions in another science (philosophy). William argues that it is possible for one mind to simultaneously believe a proposition as a first principle in one science and be aware of a demonstrative proof for that proposition in another science. Curiously, this entails that one can, for example, have faith that God exists and know how to prove God’s existence. This means that philosophy is free to offer proofs for the very propositions that theology takes as primary. In fact, William thinks that such philosophical work is necessary for theology. First, it is a means to converting others to Christianity and refuting heresy. Second, it is a means to mystical contemplation. William interprets the traditional progression of faith-understanding-wisdom on Aristotelian lines, understanding faith as mere quia knowledge of the articles of faith and understanding (intellectus) as knowledge propter quid, the ability to provide philosophical justification for the articles of faith. Understanding, in turn, leads to wisdom or sapientia, experiential knowledge of God. Thus William not only accommodates philosophy within theology, but makes it a necessary part of sacred doctrine.
“The Sources of William of Auxerre’s First Two Proofs of God.” KULeuven Institute of Philosophy Graduate Student Conference (Leuven, Belgium), March 27, 2015.
William of Auxerre has sometimes been portrayed as a theological reactionary. But in reality, he was an innovative thinker and an early adopter of Greco-Arabic philosophy. As evidence, I offer his first two proofs of God’s existence found in Summa Aurea 1.1, which I argue derive from Avicenna. In the first proof he argues that, since every effect has a cause, there must be a first cause. Normally such proofs appeal to the impossibility of an infinite regress. But William’s does not. Rather, he argues that, even if the chain of caused causes were infinite, the entire set (universitas) of caused causes would require a cause, which must logically be an uncaused cause. This curious move is not found Boethius, John of Damascus, or Gundissalinus, but it is found in Avicenna. I conclude that Avicenna’s proof of a First Cause in Shifa Metaphysics 8.1 is the source for William’s first proof of God. Curiously, however, William’s argument resembles the version in Avicenna’s Najat much more closely, even though the Najat was never translated into Latin. In any case, the derivation of William’s first proof from Avicenna may also help explain why his second proof is almost identical to the first, other than changes in vocabulary.
Jacob J. Andrews 